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RELUCTANCE AND REMORSE: THE COVENANT




The covenant of good faith and fair dealing ("the covenant" or "Good
Faith") is now an accepted feature of contractual relations in the United
States. Essentially undeveloped until the 1960s,' the obligation to act in
good faith during contract performance and enforcement gained traction
once it was written into the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and adopted
by state legislatures. 2  The covenant achieved broader recognition when
included in 1981 as a new section in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
("Restatement").3
In the employment setting, however, the covenant has not fared nearly
so well. The majority of states have declined to apply Good Faith at all
t Newton D. Baker-Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College
of Law. I am grateful to Larry Garvin, Matthew Finkin, and participants at a July 2010 Workshop at the
Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law for valuable comments in
connection with an earlier draft. Aaron Cornell, Kathy Hall, Melanie Luthern, and Melanie Oberlin
furnished excellent research assistance, Jennifer Pursell provided accomplished secretarial aid, and The
Ohio State University Moritz College of Law contributed generous financial support.
1. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith in Contract Performance, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN
CONTRACT LAW 153, 154-55 (Jack E. Beatson & Daniel Friedman eds., 1995); Robert S. Summers, The
Conceptualization of Good Faith in American Contract Law: A General Account, in GOOD FAITH IN
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 118, 119 (Reinhard Zimmerman & Simon Whittaker eds., 2000). See
generally Matthew W. Finkin et. al., Working Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed Restatement of
Employment Law: Employment Contracts: Termination, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMPL. POL'Y J. 93, 135-36
(2009).
2. Section 1-203 of the UCC provides: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." The UCC covers commercial arrangements
such as letters of credit, security agreements, and contracts for the sale of goods. The Code's general
definition of good faith is "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19)
(2004). With respect to the sale of goods, the Code further specifies that for merchants, good faith
encompasses not only honesty in fact but also "the observance of reasonable standards offair dealing in
the trade." Id. § 2-103(1)(j) (emphasis added).
3. Section 205 of the Restatement (2d) of Contracts provides: "Every contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." (emphasis
added) The Restatement is an effort to set forth the leading rules and principles in a major field or sector
of American law such as contracts, torts, agency, or trusts. Restatements are a product of the American
Law Institute, a private organization comprised of scholars, practitioners, and judges.
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when reviewing disputes between employers and individual employees.4
Moreover, although state courts have embraced an assortment of other
contract-based or tort-based theories as departures from the basic American
rule of employment-at-will,s a mere handful of jurisdictions have accepted
the covenant in at-will settings.6 Such judicial reluctance contrasts notably
with the position of labor arbitrators, who regularly incorporate the
covenant when construing the disputed terms of collective bargaining
agreements.7 Even among states that have applied Good Faith to individual
employment disputes, several have circumscribed the covenant's impact in
what amount to expressions of judicial remorse.8
This article examines the limited reach of the covenant in American
employment law. Section II begins with a brief overview of how Good
Faith has operated in the general contract setting. It then relies on judicial
examples to discuss in detail how the covenant is defined and applied in the
employment context by states that recognize its validity, as well as why so
many states resist its application. Section II also describes a diminished
commitment to Good Faith following the set of initial decisions that applied
the doctrine to employment contracts. Finally, Section II discusses cases
alleging employer deceit or misrepresentation at the hiring stage. State
courts are considerably more likely to enforce norms of good faith and fair
treatment during this contract-formation period than they have been to
impose the covenant as an implied condition of contract performance.
Section III maintains that the courts' reserved stance toward Good
Faith is grounded in the robust persistence of the employment-at-will
doctrine. The concept of employment-at-will emerged in the United States
as a complement to laissez-faire capitalism. During the nineteenth century,
an increase in nonagricultural work and transient employment relationships
was accompanied by a shift away from master-servant legal norms toward
more open-textured contractual relations.9 By the late 1800s, at-will had
replaced the traditional presumption-that hirings for an indefinite term
4. See CLYDE W. SUMMERS, KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT & ALAN HYDE, LEGAL RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS IN THE WORKPLACE: STATUTORY SUPPLEMENT AND MATERIALS 193-200 (2007) (reporting
that twenty-nine of fifty states have declined to adopt the covenant in employment context).
5. See Section II.B. infra (identifying growth of exceptions to at-will doctrine).
6. See SUMMERS, DAU-SCHMIDT, & HYDE, supra note 4 (reporting that nine or perhaps ten states
accept covenant in employment-at-will settings).
7. See Section IV, infra (discussing arbitrator decisions applying the covenant). See generally
ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 478-80 (6th ed. 2003).
8. See Section II.D.3. infra (discussing court decisions that covenant applies only in areas
separately identified as implicating public policy, and that violation of covenant is a breach of contract
but not a tort).
9. See generally CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 232-92 (1993); Peter Karsten, "Bottomed on Justice": A Reappraisal of Critical
Legal Studies Scholarship Concerning Breaches ofLabor Contracts by Quitting or Firing in Britain and
the U.S., 1630-1880, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 213, 221-24, 229, 232-35, 240-44, 250-51 (1990).
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were meant to last a full year-with the individualist conception that
indefinite hirings are terminable at the discretion of either party.'o The
enduring common law presumption that employment contracts involve
parties with equal information and bargaining power contrasts markedly
with the recognition in other legal systems that the employment relationship
is essentially one of subordination."
Section III observes that Congress and the Supreme Court have
imposed significant federal regulatory limits on the reach of employment-
at-will by prohibiting firings based on a range of specific employer
motivations. 12  Still, neither Congress nor forty-nine of the fifty states
require that decisions to terminate individual employees be justified based
on good cause or any comparable grounds. Absent affirmative statutory
protection for job security, employment-at-will remains the pervasive
default rule. Moreover, this default rule continues to exert a subtle yet
significant constraining influence on the development of major federal
statutes regulating the workplace.13 It is not surprising that state courts are
reluctant to impose norms of fairness on job security arrangements when
employers' residual authority to act in summary, arbitrary, or malicious
fashion toward their employees remains legislatively undisturbed.
10. See generally Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 118, 119, 125-27 (1976); Daniel A. Mathews, Note, A Common Law Action for the
Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1438-40 (1975).
11. See Alan L. Bogg, Good Faith in the Contract of Employment: A Case of the English
Reserve?, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 729, 746-50 (2011) (linking crafting of contractual good faith
to emergent strands of sociological realism among common law judges, including appreciation for
employees' vulnerability as collective bargaining regime effectively disappeared); Kevin Banks,
Progress and Paradox: The Remarkable Yet Limited Advance of Employer Good Faith in Canadian
Common Law, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 547, 556-57 (2011); Bemd Waas, Good Faith in the Law
of the Employment Relationship: Germany, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 603, 624-28 (2011)
(discussing examples of dismissals that violate good faith because employer lacked sensitivity to or
sufficient concern for the personal circumstances and interests of affected individual workers);
Christophe Vigneau, The Obligation of Good Faith in France, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 593, 600-
02 (2011) (addressing restrictions on employer's power of direction over his employees).
12. See Section III.A. infra (referring inter alia to National Labor Relations Act (1935), Equal Pay
Act (1963), Title VII of Civil Rights Act (1964), Occupational Safety and Health Act (1970), and
Americans With Disabilities Act (1990)), see also Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972)
(holding that public employee has protected property interest in his job, and is entitled to due process
before being deprived of that interest); Goetz v. Windsor Central Sch. Dist., 698 F.2d 606, 610 (2d Cir.
1983) (holding that public employee has liberty interest that requires a name-clearing hearing if
employer creates and disseminates false and defamatory impression in relation to his discharge).
13. See Section III.B. infra (discussing at-will's effect on NLRA, Title VII, and WARN).
2011] 775
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II. THE LIMITED REACH OF THE COVENANT IN THE EMPLOYMENT
SETTING
A. Good Faith Under General Contract Law
Good Faith as an implied contractual term has been recognized by
most American jurisdictions for at least the past several decades.14 Both the
UCC and the Restatement predicate this good-faith duty on the underlying
presence of a contract: parties are obligated during contract execution and
performance, not for the period of contract formation.' 5
The covenant is subject to certain limits even during the contract
performance period. Some courts have held that Good Faith only applies in
relation to the express provisions of a contract and the parties' reasonable
expectations flowing from those provisions.' 6 Accordingly, the doctrine
does not create an additional, independent obligation to act fairly or
reasonably that can be separately breached.' 7  Further, many courts have
held that because the implied duty does not supersede express provisions of
an agreement, parties can in effect contract around Good Faith with respect
to particular terms.18
The scope of the covenant encompasses both negative and affirmative
obligations. UCC definitions refer to "honesty in fact" and also to "the
observance of reasonable standards of fair dealing in the trade."" The
concept of honesty and fair dealing readily covers undesirable conduct such
as subterfuge or evasion to escape contractual promises, 20 or opportunistic
efforts "to take advantage of one's contracting partner in a way that could
not have been contemplated at the time of drafting, and which therefore was
not resolved explicitly by the parties."21 In addition, courts have held that
14. See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perforn in Good
Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 404 (1980) (listing cases). See generally U.C.C., §§ 1-203, 1-201(19), 2-
103(1)(b); RESTATEMENT (2d) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (discussed supra notes 2 and 3); 2 E. ALLEN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.17, at 355-56 (3d ed. 2004); Carmichael v.
Adirondack Bottled Gas Corp., 635 A.2d 1211, 1216-17 (Vt. 1993); Anthony's Pier Four v. HBC
Assocs., 583 N.E. 2d 806, 820-21 (Mass. 1991).
15. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, at 357; Travelers Indem. Co. v. CDL Hotels USA, 322
F.Supp.2d 482, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Potlatch Corp. v. Beloit Corp., 979 P.2d 114, 117 (Idaho 1999).
16. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, at 358; McAdams v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 287,
300-01 (1st Cir. 2004); Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 66 F.3d 604, 617 (3d Cir.
1995); Uno Rest. v. Boston Kenmore Realty Corp., 805 N.E. 2d 957, 964 (Mass. 2004).
17. See McAdams, 391 F.3d 300; E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS
529 (7th ed. 2008) (quoting U.C.C. Editorial Board's 1994 Commentary on U.C.C. § 1-203, which was
subsequently re-numbered § 1-304).
18. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, at 359; Kham & Nate's Shoes v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351,
1357 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.); Adams v. G.J. Creel & Sons, 465 S.E. 2d 84, 85 (S.C. 1995).
19. U.C.C., §§ 1-201(19); 2-103(l)(b).
20. See Harbor Ins. Co. v. Continental Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 363 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.);
FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, at 361.
21. Indus. Representatives v. CP Clare Corp., 74 F.3d 128, 130 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.)
(internal citations omitted).
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Good Faith may impose affirmative obligations on promisees to cooperate
in or provide reasonable support for their promisors' performance. 22  For
instance, when one contracting party has discretionary authority to
determine quantity, price, or time for completion, that party may be
required to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and fair manner.23 Courts
also have held that an insurance company may have a good faith obligation
to settle in an appropriate case,24 and that one party may be obliged to
disclose material information that was overlooked by the other party and is
not reasonably discoverable. 25
Good Faith is frequently invoked in breach of contract claims
involving franchise agreements. 26  There are certain parallels between
franchisees and employees, in that both are economically dependent on
their contractual partners and both are viewed as having arm's length rather
than fiduciary relationships with these partners.27  Courts may rely on the
covenant to hold that a franchisor's establishment of a competing outlet
violates Good Faith even though no express contract term provides for an
exclusive territory. 28 Of perhaps more direct relevance, courts have often
held that franchise agreements lacking specific durational provisions may
not be terminated without reasonable notice, allowing the franchisee
sufficient time to obtain a substitute arrangement, recoup its investment, or
minimize losses. 29
22. See Blackstone Consulting Corp. v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 463, 471 (2005); Kehm Corp. v.
United States, 93 F.Supp. 620, 623 (Ct. Cl. 1950); Larson v. Larson, 636 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (Mass.
App. 1994); FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, at 362-63.
23. See Empire Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries Co. 840 F.2d 1333, 1339 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner,
J.); Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 773 A.2d 1121, 1127-28 (N.J. 2001); Peak-Las Positas Partners v.
Bollag, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 775, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, at 365-67
(discussing output and requirement contracts).
24. See, e.g., PPG Indus. Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 655 (Cal. 1999);
Communale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200-01 (Cal. 1958).
25. See Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Frey 941 F.2d 588, 594-95 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner,
J.).
26. See generally Kathryn Lea Harman, The Good Faith Gamble in Franchise Agreements. Does
Your Implied Covenant Trump My Express Term?, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 473 (1998).
27. See, e.g., Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Transp. Corp. 823 S.W.2d 591, 594-96 (Tex.
1992) (rejecting imposition of general fiduciary duties on the franchise relationship); Amoco Oil Co. v.
Cardinal Oil Co., 535 F.Supp. 661, 666 (E.D. Wisc. 1982) (holding that obligation of good faith under
Wisconsin contract law does not make franchisor-franchisee relationship a fiduciary one). By contrast,
insurance contracts are more often deemed analogous to fiduciary relationships. See, e.g., Vu v.
Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 33 P.3d 487, 491-92 (Cal. 2001); Sobotor v. Prudential
Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 491 A.2d 737, 740-41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
28. See, e.g., Vylene Enter. v. Naugles Inc. 90 F.3d 1472, 1477 (9th Cir. 1996); Photovest Corp. v.
Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 727-28 (7th Cir. 1979); Transport Truck & Trailer Co. Inc. v. Freightliner
LLC, No. CV-06-282-S-BLW, 2007 WL 294280 at *4-*5 (D. Idaho 2007); Scheck v. Burger King
Corp. 798 F.Supp. 692, 694; (S.D. Fla. 1992). But cf Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310,
1315-18 (1lth Cir. 1999) (rejecting reasoning of Scheck and concluding that covenant does not apply
under Florida law absent breach of an express provision in franchise agreement).
29. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, at 370-76. See, e.g., Maytronics Ltd. v. Aqua Vac Systems,
Inc., 277 F.3d 1317, 1320-21 (1Ith Cir. 2002) (reasonable notice of six months required); Sofa Gallery
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To be sure, franchisees often must make substantial investments to
initiate or maintain their operations, and applying Good Faith to help
protect those investments may prevent irreparable injury and encourage
business growth.30 At the same time, employees, especially those with
longer tenure, also make substantial investments, often developing firm-
specific experience and expertise as well as spousal or family ties to the
local community that make it difficult to find a suitable substitute
arrangement or to minimize losses in wages and benefits.31 As a general
matter, employees have less business sophistication and fewer resources
than individuals who operate a franchise. Despite these relative
disadvantages, employees-as explained below-are less likely than
franchisees to enjoy the protections of the covenant.
B. Good Faith Contrasted With Other Exceptions to At- Will Employment
Although employment-at-will has been firmly in place for well over a
century, state judges in recent decades have become more cognizant of the
doctrine's harsh consequences. Since the early 1970s, courts have
developed a wide range of exceptions or limitations to employment-at-
will.32 The ubiquitous tort-based illustration is the public policy exception:
employers may not terminate employees for exercising a lawful right or
privilege, or for refusing to perform or participate in an unlawful activity.33
The most comprehensive contract-based example is the employee handbook
limitation: when employers promulgate personnel manuals or similarly
regularized written practices, such express provisions may establish
reasonable contractual expectations or entitlements for their employees.34
State courts have invoked additional common law doctrines to protect
terminated employees, albeit on a less widespread basis. These exceptions
Inc. v. Stratford Co., 872 F.2d 259, 263 (8th Cir. 1989) (reasonable notice of unspecified length
required); Monarch Beverage Co. v. Tyfield Importers, Inc., 823 F.2d 1187, 1190 (7th Cir. 1987)
(reasonable notice of thirty days required); Jen-Rath Co., Inc. v. Kit Mfg. Co. 48 P.3d 659, 663-65
(Idaho 2002) ($255,000 damages for lack of reasonable notice. See also Lumber Enter. Inc. v. Hansen,
846 P.2d 1046, 1050 (Mont. 1993) (reasonable notice of thirty days required by state statute).
30. See, e.g., Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1205 (1st Cir. 1970);
LaGuardia Assocs. v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 92 F.Supp. 2d 119, 131 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
31. See Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at
Will, 92 MICH. L. REv. 8, 24-25 (1993).
32. See generally Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the
Guard, 67 NEBR. L. REv. 7, 12-14 (1988).
33. See, e.g., Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 824 P.2d 680 (Cal, 1992); Gardner v. Loomis Armored,
Inc., 913 P.2d 377 (Wash. 1996). See generally SUMMERS, DAU-SCHMIT & HYDE, supra note 4, at 179-
92 (reporting all fifty states have adopted some version of public policy exception).
34. See, e.g., Wooley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985); Mcllravy v. Kerr-McGee,
119 F.3d 876 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying Wyoming law). See generally SUMMERS, DAU-SCHMIT &
HYDE, supra note 4, at 193-200 (reporting forty-one states have held that handbooks or personnel
manuals may give rise to contractual entitlements).
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include the tort doctrines of intentional infliction of emotional distress and
defamation35 as well as implied-in-fact oral contracts and promissory
estoppel on the contract side.36
In the employment setting, the covenant is something of a hybrid
between contract and tort. The covenant is presumed to be incorporated as
part of the contractual arrangement between employer and employee. Yet
in contrast to contract law erosions of employment-at-will that are related to
the intentions of the parties, Good Faith is implied as a matter of law. Its
justification stems not from the idea that two particular contracting parties
intended to be fair with one another, but from the idea that society imposes
a norm of fair conduct as a condition of any agreement between them. In
this regard, the covenant's expansive terms of "good faith" and "fair
dealing" resemble the comparably open-ended language of the tort-based
public policy exception.
Unlike the public policy exception, however, the covenant has never
achieved widespread endorsement. In order to understand why a handful of
states accept the covenant and why far more refuse to do so, it is useful to
consider prominent case law illustrations from each group.
C. Applying and Justifying the Covenant: Minority Rule
States adopting the covenant have articulated a number of distinct
conceptual approaches. Because courts usually define or explain the
covenant while reviewing employee terminations that may constitute a
breach, they have tended to focus on what type of employer conduct
qualifies as a lack of good faith.
1. Employee Access to Benefits of the Bargain
The prevalent approach involves protecting the benefit of the
employee's bargain against opportunistic employer behavior related to the
employee's past service. In Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co.,37 Metcalf
worked as a clerk and she accrued sick time pursuant to company policy. In
the course of undergoing two operations, she used eight weeks of her
accrued leave over a two-year period. Metcalf was then reduced to being a
35. See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance, 389 N.W. 2d 876 (Minn. 1986) (defamation); Wilson
v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying Texas law) (intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
36. See Grouse v. Group Health Plan Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981) (promissory estoppel);
Pugh v. See's Candies, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. App. 1981) (oral contract implied in fact).
37. 778 P.2d 744 (Idaho 1989).
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part-time employee "in part allegedly because of her sick leave status";38
she subsequently resigned.
In reversing a grant of summary judgment entered against Metcalf, the
Idaho Supreme Court announced its adoption of the covenant for
employment contracts. The court explained that the covenant "protects the
parties' benefits in their employment contract or relationship, and ... any
action which violates, nullifies, or significantly impairs any benefit or right
which either party has in the employment contract, whether express or
implied, is a violation of the covenant." 39 In this instance, the employer
may well have violated the covenant by offering Metcalf the opportunity to
earn and use sick leave benefits and then penalizing her for depending on
those same benefits.40
The Idaho Supreme Court eschewed any reliance on the "amorphous
concept of bad faith,"' noting that it did not want to get in the business of
distinguishing a "bad faith" discharge from a no-cause discharge that is
clearly permitted under at-will doctrine. 42  Assuming that Metcalf's
departure amounted to a constructive termination, the court's justification
was narrower. Once Metcalf bargained for sick leave benefits as part of her
employment arrangements, her employer's retaliatory reduction in her
working status unlawfully undermined her access to or enjoyment of those
earned benefits.
The Arizona Supreme Court set forth a similar rationale in
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital.43 Nurse Wagenseller was
terminated several months after a rafting and camping trip with her
supervisor and other hospital personnel, during which she refused to take
part in many group activities she regarded as unsavory." Wagenseller had
very high job performance evaluations before the rafting trip; she
maintained that her refusal to participate in the off-color group conduct led
to deteriorating relationships with management, ending in her termination.45
The Arizona court rejected Wagenseller's argument that termination
without good cause is a violation of the covenant. At the same time, the
court recognized the existence of the covenant in at-will employment
contracts as "protect[ing] an employee from a discharge based on an
employer's desire to avoid the payment of benefits already earned by the
38. Id at 746.
39. Id. at 749.
40. See id at 753 (concurring opinion).
41. Id at 749.
42. See id.
43. 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz 1995).
44. See id. at 1029. The activities included "public urination, defecation, and bathing, heavy
drinking, and 'grouping up' with other rafters."
45. See id.
780
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employee. "46 Even in an at-will setting, there may be numerous terms
agreed to between the parties, such as "that the employer will provide the
necessary working conditions [for performing the required work] and pay
the employee for work done." 47 The court added, however, that an
assurance of continued employment or tenure can never be one of the terms
agreed to as part of at-will employment; because Wagenseller was claiming
a breach of her right to continued employment, her claim under the
covenant must fail.48
Perhaps the most recognized instance of employers terminating their
employees to recapture or avoid payment of specified benefits involves
commission-based compensation arrangements. In the leading case of
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,49 an experienced salesman's written
contract specified both his at-will status and his right to a weekly salary
plus a bonus for equipment sales made within the territory assigned to him.
Fortune helped secure a five million dollar purchase order from an
established customer that called for delivery of cash register machines over
a four-year period. He was given a termination notice dated the first
working day following the consummation of the purchase, but then was
asked to stay on in a reduced "sales support" capacity to coordinate the
delivery process. Eventually he received three-fourths of his bonus; after
his termination he sued to recover the remaining one-fourth.so
In reinstating a $45,000 jury verdict, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
identified the central issue on appeal as whether the employer's "bad faith"
termination amounted to a breach of the at-will employment contract.51
Under the express terms of his contract, Fortune had received the full bonus
commissions to which he was entitled.52 Moreover, the employer had not
simply pocketed the remaining 25%, but had given it to another employee
who assisted with the installation process.53  Nonetheless, the
Massachusetts court determined that the written employment contract
contained an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that
Fortune was entitled to a jury determination as to whether that covenant
46. Id at 1040 (emphasis added).
47. Id
48. See id at 1040-41. Wagenseller did survive summary judgment under the public policy
exception, as she allegedly was fired for refusing to participate in conduct arguably violative of
Arizona's indecent exposure statute. See id. at 1035-36, 1044.
49. 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass 1976).
50. See id at 1253-54 (describing facts).
51. Id at 1255.
52. The contract called for Fortune to be paid 75% of the applicable bonus credit if the territory
was assigned to him on the date of the purchase order and 25% if the territory was assigned to him on
the date of final delivery and installation. See id. at 1253.
53. See id. at 1254. This payment to a systems-and-installation employee, however, was contrary
to the company's normal policy of paying bonuses only to salesmen. Id
7812011]
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was breached given the circumstances of his firing. In particular, a jury
reasonably could have found that Fortune was stripped of his "salesman"
designation and subsequently fired in order to disqualify him for the
remaining 25% of the commissions due on delivery of the cash registers.54
The Fortune decision goes beyond Metcalf and Wagenseller in
applying the covenant to contract benefits an employee was on the brink of
earning, as opposed to benefits he already had earned. Moreover, the fact
the employer gave the commission to another employee rather than keeping
the money itself was not enough to establish good faith conduct, at least
where the other employee was not a "salesman" as anticipated under
company policy. But although the employer's alleged bad faith termination
may well have breached the covenant with respect to an at-will employee,
Fortune's remedy was not reinstatement but rather the payment of benefits
he would have earned but for the fact he was discharged. The
Massachusetts court, like its sister courts in Idaho and Arizona, adopted the
covenant in order to redress violation of a definite term-in this instance,
compensation-contained in an employment agreement that was indefinite
with respect to job security. This approach effectively allows a court to
reconcile the covenant with the continued validity of at-will employment.
2. Employer Misrepresentations Affecting the Term of Job Security
A second-and less frequent-approach focuses on employer
misrepresentations that more directly implicate the contract term of job
security. Under this approach, the covenant may apply if an employer
misrepresents its present intentions and the employee relies on this
misrepresentation to accept a new job or to continue in a current position.
In Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court
reviewed an employee's claim that his employer had induced him to accept
an indefinite-term job offer while secretly intending to keep him on only
temporarily until a suitable permanent candidate was identified and hired.
54. See id. at 1255-58.
55. For other decisions holding that the covenant prohibits firing for the purpose of preventing an
employee from sharing in future profits, see Mitford v. de LaSala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1006-07 (Alaska
1983); Somers v. Somers, 613 A.2d 1211, 1213-14 (Pa. Super. Court 1992); Hall v. Farmers Insurance,
713 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Okla. 1985); Jordan v. Duff & Phelps 815 F.2d 429, 438-39 (7th Cir. 1987)
(applying Illinois law).
56. Compare FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, at 372-76 (discussing case law applying covenant
under UCC to mitigate the harshness of termination-at-will rule traditionally used for exclusive
distributorship and franchise agreements); cases cited at supra notes 29-30 (same).
57. 606 A.2d 96 (Del. 1992).
58. See id. at 98-99. Employee Merrill's allegations, viewed favorably on the appeal from a
dismissal, were that he was hired merely so his employer could fulfill its contractual obligation to find a
director of plant operations and that his eventual replacement was interviewed two days after he himself
had been hired. Id.
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The court held that the covenant applies to the formation of employment
contracts, and a breach may be shown by establishing that the employer's
conduct in negotiating the job security provision is tantamount to fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation. 59 In this instance, Merrill had pleaded a valid
claim because he received less than what he bargained for respecting job
security: "an employer may not in good faith knowingly allow an employee
to assume that the duration of an employment contract is indefinite, when it
is, in secret contemplation of the employer, of limited duration."60  The
court added that the proposed or reasonably anticipated longevity of an
employment contract is "clearly material to one's decision to accept a new
position, especially where, as here, the assumption of the new position
requires surrender of present employment."61 The court cautioned,
however, that its holding dealt only with employer deception on the issue of
duration, a deception that induced the employee to form a contract.
Because Merrill's subsequent firing merely gave effect to the earlier
deception, the court did not rest its holding on what might constitute just
grounds for terminating an at-will arrangement.62
Four years after Merrill, the Delaware Supreme Court decided the
covenant also could apply to conditions related to a termination even
though no legally cognizable harm arises from the termination itself. In
DuPont de Nemours and Co. v. Pressman,63 the employee was an engineer
at DuPont who received positive evaluations and pay raises until he
suggested to his supervisor that the supervisor might have a conflict of
interest as an advisor to an outside company. Pressman alleged that the
supervisor became angry with him when he raised this issue, and that over
the ensuing months the supervisor launched a campaign to discredit him by
creating false negative information about his job performance and
concealing positive information. 64
The Delaware court observed that Pressman's claim did not implicate
considerations of public policy incident to his firing, because he did not
assert any public interest that was recognized by a legislative,
59. Id. at 101. Extension of the covenant to contract formation goes beyond the Restatement and
UCC, which address contract performance and enforcement. See supra notes 23. See also infra at
Section II.E.2. for further discussion of this distinction.
60. 606 A.2d at 102. This absence of good faith did not amount to fraud in the inducement
according to the Delaware court. Although Merrill alleged that his employer misrepresented the
position as "permanent," he accepted the job knowing he was to be an at-will employee. What he did
not realize was that the employer had a plan for implementing his at-will status that was itself deceitful
at the time of contract formation.
61. Id. at 102.
62. Id.
63. 679 A.2d 436 (Del 1996).
64. See id. at 439,444.
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administrative, or judicial authority.65 Nonetheless, the court concluded
that if the jury believed Pressman's allegations, they would amount to a
breach of the covenant. The court distinguished these allegations from
evidence that an employer might discharge an employee "maliciously, that
is, as a result of hatred [or] ill will." 66 Discharging an employee based on a
supervisor's personal animosity was permissible under the at-will doctrine.
But using deceit and subterfuge to manufacture false grounds for discharge
by the supervisor's superiors "went beyond the broad, permissible scope of
the Doctrine and crossed into the limited zone of the Covenant." 67
These first two groups of cases involve justifications that sound in
contract rather than tort. State courts in both instances viewed the covenant
as protecting identified benefits of the employment bargain. In Metcalf and
Fortune, the bargained-for benefit is a term other than job security. In
Merrill and Pressman, the contract term at issue is job security, but "good
faith" is quite narrowly defined. The covenant confers protection only
against discharges premised on fraudulent or deceitful manipulation of the
employee's indefinite-term arrangement. These two contract-based
approaches may have limited impact for many if not most employees. For a
start, employees and employers may lack a clear understanding about
initially negotiated terms, especially terms related to job security.68 In
addition, discharges resulting from an employer's manipulation or
misrepresentation of particular negotiated terms and conditions are likely to
be unusual as compared with discharges that are simply arbitrary, negligent,
or even malicious without being motivated by an attempt to negate or
recapture aspects of the earlier bargain.
3. Tort-Based Justifications
Two other sets of decisions involve justifications for the covenant that
sound in tort. One essentially treats violation of the covenant as a subset of
the public policy exception to at-will employment. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court initially held that firings based on retaliation, malice, or bad
65. See id at 441-42.
66. Id at 444.
67. Id See also Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hospital, 693 P.2d 487, 490, 492 (Mont. 1984)
(affirming judgment based on discharged employee's claim that employer acted with malice by lodging
false charges against her and tampering with her personnel file)
68. See Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return of the Common
Law, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1783, 1994-95 (1996) (identifying "significant strategic barriers" to negotiations
at hiring stage, including "mutual temptation toward wooing" and difficulty for employees to raise
conditions of discharge "without appearing to reveal a propensity for shirking"); Monique C. Lillard,
Fifty Jurisdictions in Search of a Standard: The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in the
Employment Context, 57 Mo. L. REv. 1233, 1250-51 (1992) (contending that employers and employees
are often not clear about the specifics of their bargain, especially at the outset of their relationship).
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faith constituted a breach of the covenant because they were "not in the best
interest of the economic system or the public good."69 It subsequently has
confined the scope of the covenant to firings based on employee
performance of an act that public policy would encourage, or employee
refusal to engage in conduct that public policy would condemn. 70  By
making this change, the New Hampshire court effectively eschewed
reliance on the doctrine of integrity-of-contracts as important enough to
include within the public policy exception. Implicit in the court's shift is an
acceptance of the notion that the absence of good faith or fair dealing
involves harm to the contracting parties but not to society as a whole.
The other tort-based justification involves a breach outside the at-will
setting-violating contractual limits on the employer's right to terminate-
when the employer acts with malice. The Nevada Supreme Court has
applied the covenant to protect employees with long-term employment
contracts (express or implied) who are discharged in bad faith, for reasons
such as to prevent the vesting of retirement benefits,7' or to retaliate for
truthful courtroom testimony.72 The court reasoned that a breach of the
covenant exists and gives rise to tort liability in those instances when a
special element of trust, dependency, and reliance is present between
employee and employer, comparable to what exists between an insured
party and her insurer.73 Faithful long-term employees with reasonable
expectations of lifetime or continuing jobs may seek tort damages for their
employer's betrayal of trust in such settings.74 But at-will employees do not
enjoy this special relationship of trust and reliance, and the Nevada court
has made clear that the covenant does not apply to them at all.
69. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974).
70. See Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 1143 (N.H. 1981); Howard v.
Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (N.H. 1980). See also Smith v. American Greetings Co., 804
S.W.2d 683, 684 (Ark. 1991); Luedke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling Co., 768 P.2d 1123, 1130 (Alas. 1989).
71. See Kmart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987) (abrogated with respect to retirement
benefits on ERISA preemption grounds, Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990)).
72. See Shoen v. Amerco Inc., 896 P.2d 469 (Nev. 1995).
73. See Ponsock, supra 732 P.2d at 1371-73.
74. See Schoen, 896 P.2d at 475-76. See also Wilder v. Cody Co. Chamber of Commerce, 868
P.2d 211, 220-21 (Wyo. 1995) (recognizing a tort claim for breach of the covenant when special
relationship of trust and reliance exists between employee and employer).
75. See Sands Regent v. Valgardson, 777 P.2d 898, 899 (Nev. 1989); Smith v. Cladianos, 752 P.2d
233, 235 (Nev. 1988). See also Loghry v. Unicover Corp. 927 P.2d 706, 711-12 (Wyo. 1996)
(declining to recognize cause of action for breach of the covenant under a contract theory); Life Care
Centers of America v. Dexter, 65 P.3d 385, 394-95 (Wyo. 2003) (declining to recognize tort action for
breach of the covenant because employee's six years of employment for employer, without more, was
insufficient to establish a special relationship).
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D. Rejecting and Criticizing the Covenant: Majority Rule
1. Limited Rationales for Rejection
The majority of states do not recognize the covenant in the
employment setting, and have propounded various rationales for refusing to
do so. Preliminarily, a somewhat puzzling justification relies on the
purported vagueness of the underlying good faith definition. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the covenant primarily because to do
otherwise would "subject each discharge to judicial incursions into the
amorphous concept of bad faith."76 Other states have invoked this
vagueness rationale as well.77
It is far from clear, however, that bad faith is all that amorphous a
concept. One judicially proffered test states that a discharge is in bad faith
"if and only if [the employer] does not believe he has a legal right to
discharge the employee."7' An alternative formulation defines bad faith as
"conduct by the employer extraneous to the employment contract aimed at
frustrating the employee's enjoyment of contractual rights." 79 Even if one
concludes the standard should be more fine-grained than these examples,
state judges seem quite capable of adding appropriate texture. States have
developed a range of nuanced approaches to other employment-related
common law concepts such as the scope of the public policy exception8 0 or
the contours of a valid disclaimer in an employee handbook. 1 Moreover,
given that "good faith" and "fair dealing" have been widely applied in non-
employment settings under the UCC, courts should be able to develop
comparably acceptable approaches for employment contracts as well.
Another explanation for rejecting the covenant is legislative
foreclosure. Arizona has codified certain exclusive grounds for employees
to challenge their discharges. 82  Those grounds include violation of a
written contract that expressly restricts the employer's right to terminate,
but not the breach of any implied terms or conditions.83 Arizona's law was
76. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W. 2d 834, 838 (Wis. 1983).
77. See, e.g., Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549, 554 (Okla. 1987); Parnar v. Americana Hotels,
Inc. 652 P.2d 625, 629 (Haw. 1982).
78. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. 765 P.2d 373, 409 (Cal. 1988) (Broussard, J., dissenting).
79. Melnick v. State Farm Automobile Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 1105, 1009 (N.M. 1988).
80. For California, examples include Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 684, 687-88 (Cal. 1992)
and Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court of San Bernadino Co., 876 P.2d 487, 498-501 (Cal. 1994).
For Illinois, examples include Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E. 2d 104, 107-11 (111. 1991) and Parr v.
Triplett Corp., 727 F.Supp. 1163, 1165-67 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
81. For New Jersey, see, for instance, Nicosia v. Wakefern Food Corp., 643 A.2d 554, 559-62
(N.J. 1994); Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 491 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J. 1985). For Wyoming, see, for
instance, McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing Inc., 820 P.2d 986, 988-89 (Wyo. 1991); Jiminez v.
Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 690 F.Supp. 977, 980 (D. Wyo. 1988).
82. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann § 23-1501 (1996).
83. See id at § 23-1501 (1), (2), (3)(a).
786
HeinOnline  -- 32 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 786 2010-2011
2011] UNITED STATES 787
enacted in response to the Wagenseller decision,84 and its exclusive grounds
for wrongful termination claims are by now well settled."
Relatedly, the Montana Supreme Court had applied the covenant to
employment contracts and awarded punitive damages for breach since the
early 1980s,86 but the Montana legislature curtailed the impact of these
decisions in 1987 as part of its Wrongful Discharge from Employment
Act. Montana's statute establishes as elements of wrongful discharge an
absence of good cause-legislatively defined-and also an employer's
violation of its express written personnel policies.8 8  The statute, however,
limits recovery for these violations to lost wages and benefits, eliminating
access to punitive damages.89
2. More Widespread Rationales for Rejection
Notwithstanding the statutory initiatives in Arizona and Montana,
legislative foreclosure is seldom a basis for refusing to apply the
covenant.90 Rather, state jurisdictions rely more heavily on the common
law to shape, monitor, and enforce contractual aspects of the employment
relationship. 91 In that regard, two common-law-related justifications have
emerged for rejecting the covenant. The first focuses on extrinsic factors:
the covenant may be redundant given other common law options available
to discharged or exploited employees. The second involves a matter of
84. See supra at notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., White v. AKDHC, 664 F.Supp.2d 1054, 1061-62 (D. Ariz. 2009); Fallar v.
Compuware Corp. 202 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1075-76 (D. Ariz. 2002). South Dakota is a second jurisdiction
that has created by statute exclusive grounds for terminating the employment relationship. See S.D.
Laws, 60-4-4 (stating that "An employment having no specified term may be terminated at the will of
either party on notice to the other, unless otherwise provided by statute").
86. See, e.g., Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Mont. 1982) (recognizing
covenant as implied in employment handbook); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 213, 214-15
(1983) (sustaining award of punitive damages for breach of covenant); Crenshaw v. Bozeman
Deaconess Hosp., 693 P.2d 487, 492 (Mont. 1984) (holding that probationary at-will employee is owed
duty of good faith and may receive punitive damages).
87. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1987).
88. See id., § 4(1)(b),(c); the definition of "good cause" is at id. § 3(5). Montana is the only state
to enact a statute prohibiting termination without good cause, although the Virgin Islands also has a
wrongful discharge law specifying valid grounds for dismissal. See 24 V.I. CODE ANN. § 76 (1986).
89. See MONT. CODE. ANN., § 5(1). The Montana statute also prohibits discharges in violation of
public policy, and tort damages are available under that provision. See id., §§ 4(l)(a), 5(2).
90. Other jurisdictions specifying valid statutory grounds for dismissal do not address the covenant
in relation to these grounds. See 24 V.I. CODE ANN. § 76 (discussed supra at note 88); 29 P.R. LAWS
ANN. § 185b (2008) (Puerto Rico).
91. A different legislative-foreclosure argument is premised on inaction: because the state
legislature has not modified the contractually-grounded rule of employment at will, courts should not do
so by imposing requirements such as the covenant. See Murphy v. American Home Products, 448
N.E.2d 86, 89-90 (N.Y. 1983). Of course, the at-will term of employment contracts was created in the
first instance as a matter of common law, and it is far from clear why legislative silence should preclude
courts from subsequently modifying the term or even renouncing it as a matter of common law.
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internal coherence: the covenant may be incompatible with the concept of
at-will employment.
A number of states have suggested that the covenant is unnecessary in
light of other established or evolving causes of action available to
employees. For state courts that view the covenant as covering only
terminations in violation of independently defined public policy, a cause of
action for breach of the covenant becomes duplicative of claims based on
the public policy exception.92 Some state courts have sidestepped the need
for an implied-in-law covenant by invoking implied-in-fact contract
theories based on employee manuals or an employer's oral representations
and longstanding informal practices.93 And still others have suggested that
unfair treatment can be addressed in the employment setting through the
doctrines of promissory estoppel 94 or quantum meruit. 95  Some of these
courts have embraced the language and rhetoric of good faith and fair
dealing but they have done so while applying a non-covenant-based cause
of action.96
The redundancy argument invokes other common law doctrines to
reduce if not eliminate the covenant's domain. This argument in turn
reflects states' underlying uncertainty about the need for a generalized legal
norm of good faith and fairness in employment contracts. Broadly
speaking, a discharge that is unfair as a matter of law can be viewed as
violating the state's promulgated norms on fairness-typically expressed in
its statutes and regulations and therefore already protected by the public
policy exception. 97 A discharge that is manipulative or opportunistically
motivated without implicating unlawful conduct or recognized public
obligations may still be viewed as unfair or in bad faith, because it induces
detrimental reliance by the employee or because it leaves the employee
uncompensated for mutually anticipated performance. The harm of
detrimental reliance is addressed under the doctrine of promissory
92. See cases discussed supra at note 70 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., McIlravy v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 119 F.3d 876 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying Wyoming
law) (employee handbook); Witkowski v. Lipton, Inc. 643 A.2d 546 (N.J. 1994) (employee manual);
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. App. 1981) (employer oral representations). See
generally Schwab, supra note 31.
94. See, e.g., Bowers v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 852 F.2d 361, 363-66 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying
Missouri law); Peck v. Imedia Inc., 679 A.2d 745, 753 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
95. See, e.g., Fred Ezra Co. v. Pedas, 682 A.2d 173, 175-77 (D.C. Ct. App. 1996); Eaton v.
Engelcke Mfg. Co., 681 P.2d 1312, 1314-15 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
96. See, e.g., Peck v. Imedia, 679 A.2d at 753 (applying promissory estoppel); Luedke v. Nabors
Alaska Drilling Co., 768 P.2d 1123, 1130 (Alaska 1989) (invoking public policy considerations);
Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 1143 (N.H. 1981) (same).
97. See Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 824 P.2d 680, 684 (Cal. 1992) (identifying four generally
agreed-upon categories in which state courts find violations of public policy: (i) refusing to violate a
statute; (ii) performing a statutory obligation; (iii) exercising a statutory right or privilege; and (iv)
reporting an alleged violation of a statute of public importance).
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estoppel;98 the injury of uncompensated performance may be redressed
under the doctrine of quantum meruit.99 Even when broadly applicable
doctrines like public policy or promissory estoppel do not apply, the
employment relationship typically encompasses multiple terms and
conditions implemented over an extended period of time. Accordingly,
there are often past representations and practices-written and oral-that
give rise to fact-based claims alleging unfair or bad faith conduct, claims
that are based on the reasonably inferred intent of the particular parties. 00
In sum, given the diverse options available under tort and contract law for
employees who are unfairly discharged or exploited, it is not surprising that
many courts have struggled with the need for a separate affirmative
requirement of good faith and fair dealing.
Beyond considerations of redundancy, the most widespread state court
opposition stems from a perceived conflict between the covenant and the
doctrine of employment-at-will. One court noted that the at-will rule allows
employers to discharge their employees "arbitrarily and capriciously absent
a violation of public policy or an [express] agreement to the contrary," and
reasoned that this employer right was wholly inconsistent with an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'o' Another court opined that to
recognize the covenant "would require the imposition of a duty of care upon
an employer when discharging an employee [that] would radically alter the
long recognized doctrine allowing discharge for any reason or no reason at
all."' 02  Other state courts also have focused on tension between the
covenant's imposition of a duty and the employer's pre-existing right to
terminate for any reason-including a bad faith reason-as part of
managing its workforce.' 03
98. See Grouse v. Group Health Plan Inc. 306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981) (holding that
pharmacist whose job offer was revoked was entitled to recover damages for what he lost in quitting his
former job and in declining other employment); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (providing that "a
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance by the promisee
or a third person, and which does induce such action or forbearance, is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise").
99. Courts may award recovery under a quantum meruit theory when employees perform work for
an employer at her request but without an express contract. See, e.g., Fred Ezra Co., 682 A.2d at 176-
77; Eaton, 681 P.2d at 1315; Tinney v. Tessier Realtors, Inc., 447 So.2d 1099, 1101-02 (La. Ct. App.
1984). See generally Candace S. Kovacic, A Proposal to Simplify Quantum Meruit Litigation, 35 AM.
L. REV. 547, 582-86 (1986).
100. See cases cited supra at note 93.
101. Cockels v. Int'l Bus. Expositions, 406 N.W.2d 465, 468 (Mich. App. 1987).
102. Huegerich v. IBP, Inc., 547 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa 1996) (discussing doctrine of negligent
discharge, which it described as closely analogous to the covenant).
103. See, e.g., Bard v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 590 A.2d 152, 156 (Maine 1991); Hillesland v. Fed.
Land Bank Ass'n of Grand Forks, 407 N.W. 2d 206, 214 (N.D. 1987); Hunt v. IBM Mid Am. Emp. Fed.
Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853, 858-59 (Minn. 1986); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d
834, 838 (Wis. 1983); Edelman v. Franklin Iron & Metal Corp., 622 N.E.2d 411, 414 (Oh. Ct. App.
1993).
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New York's highest court has been especially forceful about what it
regards as the incoherence of adopting the covenant in an employment
setting.1 Acknowledging that the covenant is well-established in the
commercial context, the court stressed that it can be implied "only where
the implied term is consistent with other mutually agreed upon terms in the
contract." 0 5 One such term in every at-will employment contract is that
"the law accords the employer an unfettered right to terminate employment
at any time."l 06 In short, "it would be incongruous" to draw any inference
"that the employer impliedly agreed to a provision which would be
destructive of his [unrestricted] right of termination."10 7
As the New York court recognized, the terms "good faith" and "fair
dealing" have developed a set of meanings in the context of commercial
contracts where parties have an agreed common purpose and justified
expectations. But in employment-at-will, where the parties have agreed that
the employee may be terminated for any reason including a bad reason,
there may be no justified expectations regarding an employee's continuing
employment from one day to the next. The parties may decide to restrict
the employer's right to discharge, both substantively and procedurally, by
express agreement. 08 Under these circumstances, to imply a restriction on
discharge-related conduct from the existence of a contract that includes an
unrestricted right to discharge seems problematic.
What is problematic, however, may not be fatal. As long as the core of
the breach is not termination per se but termination before certain benefits
have been received,' 09 or before other justified expectations have been
realized,1" 0 there may be tension without irreconcilable conflict. Indeed,
such implied protections against discharge for exercising a contractual right
or privilege might be seen as analogous to protections implied under tort
law against discharge for exercising a statutory or other public right or
privilege. Still, what is implied under the public policy exception is an
extension of the public policy itself-as when one cannot be fired for filing
a workers' compensation claim or for serving on a jury. In the contract
setting, it remains odd to think of an at-will employer as having impliedly
104. See, e.g., Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc. 506 N.E.2d 919, 922 (N.Y. 1987); Murphy v.
American Home Products, 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (N.Y. 1983).
105. Sabetay, 506 N.E.2d at 922.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. A substantive limit might include prohibiting discharges for use of allotted sick leave or based
on efforts to collect earned commission payments. A procedural limit might include requiring some
period of advance notice, a warning, or even a meeting or hearing before implementing a discharge.
109. See, e.g., Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas. Co., 778 P.2d 744 (Id. 1989); Fortune v. Nat'l Cash
Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255-58 (Mass. 1976).
110. See, e.g., Merrill v. Couthall-American Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 101-02 (Del. 1992); E.I. DuPont De
Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436 (Del. 1996).
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agreed as a matter of law to any term that would be destructive of his right
to fire his employees.
3. Remorse Following Earlier Embrace
In retrospect, the covenant's halcyon days within American
employment law probably occurred during the 1980s. Courts began to
embrace the concept of an employer duty of good faith and fair dealing in
several leading cases decided between 1974 and 1980.' These initial
formulations were vigorous and open-ended. Courts concluded that for all
employment contracts-including at-will contracts-there is a public
interest in balancing the employer's need to operate his business as he sees
fit against the employee's need to keep his job.1 12 The covenant was part of
''a continuing trend toward recognition . . . of certain implied contract rights
to job security, necessary to ensure social stability in our society."113
Accordingly, termination of at-will employment "which is motivated by
bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not [in] the best interest of the
economic system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the
employment contract. "114
The Restatement's pronouncement that "every contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement"' 15 furnished grounds for further optimism. One law review
commentator even suggested that the covenant might become the leading
edge in judicial efforts to modify the rule of employment-at-will:
The implication of a duty to terminate only in good faith.. .is perhaps
the most appealing area for judicial development in the at will area
because it is consistent with a recognition that at will terminations do
not necessarily reflect the parties' intentions or best interests with
respect to job security. Because employers and employees do not have
the opportunity to engage in informed bargaining, courts following
Fortune simply supply a reasonable term.1 16
During the 1980s, courts in a number of states applied the covenant to
employment contracts for the first time.1 17
111. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974); Fortune, 364 N.E.2d at
1255-58; Cleary v. Am. Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 453-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
112. See Monge, 316 A.2d at 551 (cited with approval in Fortune, 364 N.E.2d at 1257).
113. Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 455.
114. Monge, 316 A.2d at 551.
115. RESTATEMENT (2D) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (emphasis added).
116. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only
in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816, 1838 (1980).
117. See, e.g., Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas. Co. 778 P.2d 744 (Id. 1989); Hoffman La-Roche v.
Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 738 (Ala. 1987); Kmart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987);
Tymshare v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (inferring that Virginia recognizes covenant
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Since this surge of enthusiasm, however, judicial interest in the
covenant has notably abated. After 1990, it appears that only two states
have joined the initial group endorsing good faith." 8  By contrast, a far
greater number of state courts have announced or reiterated their rejection
of the covenant in the employment setting."19
In addition, courts that had recognized good faith have retreated with
respect to the scope of their commitment. As previously discussed, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court abandoned its conclusion that bad faith or
malicious termination of at-will employees automatically amounted to a
breach of the covenant. The court held instead that such employer
misconduct was unlawful only if it also violated the state's public policy.' 20
This narrower approach was then adopted by other courts. 121
The California Supreme Court has retrenched as well. A series of
decisions by intermediate appellate courts had authorized tort damages for
bad faith discharges in violation of the covenant. 122 In 1988, however, the
Supreme Court in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.123 held that breach of the
covenant by an employer gave rise only to contract damages. The
California court recognized that tort damages were regularly available for
breach of the covenant in the context of insurance contracts. But the
majority distinguished insurance companies from employers by viewing
insurers as suppliers of a quasi-public service whose contractual obligations
were analogous to those of a fiduciary.124 Importantly, the California court
further reasoned that given the adhesive nature of insurance contracts, the
in employment cases); Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch. 713 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985); Mitford v. de LaSala,
666 P.2d 1000 (Alas. 1983).
118. See Merrill v. Crouthall-American Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 101-02 (Del. 1992); Wilder v. Cody Co.
Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 222 (Wyo. 1994).
119. See, e.g., City of Midland v. O'Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 213-16 (Tex. 2000); Kerrigan v.
Britches of Georgetowne Inc. 705 A.2d 624, 626-27 (D.C. Ct. App. 1997); Ross v. Times Mirror Inc.,
665 A.2d 580, 586 (Vt. 1995); Miller v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 455 S.E. 2d 799, 802-03
(W.Va. 1995); Pacheco v. Raytheon Co., 623 A.2d 464,465 (R.I. 1993); Bard v. Bath Iron Works Corp.,
590 A.2d 152, 156 (Me. 1991); Suburban Hosp. Inc. v. Dwiggins, 596 A.2d 1069, 1077 (Md. Ct. App.
1991); Brehany v. Nordstrom Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55-56 (Utah 1991). See also Baradell v. Board of Soc.
Services Pittsylvania Co., 970 F. Supp. 489, 494 (W.D. Va. 1994) (stating that Virginia does not
recognize the covenant in employment cases).
120. See Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 1143 (N.H. 1981); Howard v.
Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (N.H. 1980).
121. See Smith v. Am. Greetings Co., 804 S.W.2d 683, 684 (Ark. 1991); Luedke v. Nabors Alaska
Drilling Co., 768 P.2d 1123, 1130 (Alaska 1983).
122. See Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1116 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Rulon-Miller
v. Int'l Business Machines Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 247-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Cleary v. American
Airlines, Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 453-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). See generally Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 404-405 (1988) (dissenting opinion) (discussing eight unanimous Court of Appeal
decisions permitting tort actions for bad faith discharges).
123. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
124. See id. at 390, 394, 396.
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relationship of insurer and insured is "inherently unbalanced" in a way that
employee-employer relationships are not. 125
The Foley decision, issued by a closely divided court,126 altered the
remedial landscape for breach-of-covenant claims. United States courts do
not ordinarily permit punitive damages or emotional distress damages for
breach of contract, at least when unaccompanied by a tort. Without access
to punitive awards or to damages for emotional harm, there is a reduced
incentive for discharged employees to bring claims based on the covenant
as contrasted with tort-based claims alleging public policy violations,
defamation, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. 2 7 A number of
states have followed California's lead in the years since Foley. Some have
disallowed tort remedies altogether.128 Others have restricted tort actions to
covenant violations involving long-term employees with firmly embedded
expectations, whose trust and dependency on their employer's good faith is
explicitly analogized to the insurance setting.129 In sum, the covenant's
diminished application to employment contracts reflects elements of
judicial remorse among some states that had been early supporters.
E. Additional Conundrums
1. Lack of Mutuality
A further concern regarding the covenant's applicability in the
employment setting, raised in scholarship if not state courts, involves the
possible lack of mutuality.'30 Unlike contracting parties in a standard
commercial context, employers and employees do not typically bring
comparable resources or equivalent expectations to the relationship. The
question arises as to what if any good faith duties an employee owes to her
employer that might justify imposing a comparable obligation upon her
employer to act honestly and observe basic norms of fair dealing.
125. See id at 390, 396.
126. The vote was 4-3, and the dissenting judges focused on the contract v. tort issue. See id. at
402-412 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 412-18 (Kauffman, J., concurring and
dissenting); id. at 418 (Mosk, J., joining opinions of Broussard and Kaufman).
127. See generally David J. Jung, Jury Verdicts in Wrongful Termination Cases, Parts IV.D., VII
(Pub. Law Research Inst., Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law 1997) (reporting that average and
median wrongful termination verdicts in California from 1992-96 were lower for contract cases than tort
cases, and emphasizing the impact of California court's decision to eliminate punitive damages for cases
based on breach of contract).
128. See, e.g., Grant v. Butler, 590 So.2d 254, 256 (Ala. 1991); Varnado v. Roadway Express, 557
So.2d 413, 415 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
129. See, e.g., Shoen v. Amerco, 896 P.2d 469, 476 (Nev. 1995); Sands Regent v. Valgardson, 777
P.2d 898, 899 (Nev. 1989); Life Care Centers of America v. Dexter, 65 P.3d 385, 394-95 (Wyo. 2003);
Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 927 P.2d 706, 711-12 (Wyo. 1996).
130. See Robert C. Bird, An Employment Contract "Instinct With an Obligation": Good Faith
Costs and Contexts, 28 PACE L. REV. 409,417-21 (2008).
2011] 793
HeinOnline  -- 32 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 793 2010-2011
COMP. LABOR LAW & POL'Y JOURNAL [Vol. 32:773
One response might be to invoke aspects of the employee's obligation
to render loyal and faithful service. If an employee were to divert business
to a competitor, or disparage the employer's products or services, or
disclose confidential information, such conduct could be viewed as
depriving her employer of key benefits of the contract.13' These kinds of
disloyal or unfaithful acts by employees are in fact monitored and regulated,
but not pursuant to the covenant of good faith. Rather, as Benjamin Aaron
and Matthew Finkin observed more than a decade ago, employers typically
challenge such employee conduct based either on separate non-compete
covenants or on statutory and common law tort theories relating to
misappropriation or breach of trust.132
It is worth noting that in several other countries where good faith is
recognized in more robust and meaningful terms, mutual obligations are
expressly integrated as part of its scope.'33 In these legal systems, at least
some of employee's responsibilities to render loyal and faithful service are
understood to stem from the covenant. 134  By contrast, the primary
employee duties of loyalty under U.S. law-nondiversion of employer
business to a competitor while still employed, nondisclosure of confidential
information, nondisparagement of the employer's products and services-
seem to be grounded in the earlier, hierarchical master-servant relationship
rather than in more contemporary, egalitarian contractual norms.135  But
whatever the historical explanation, courts' lack of attentiveness to mutual
obligations or responsibilities under the covenant is one more indication of
its awkward place in the employment setting.
131. See generally Benjamin Aaron & Matthew Finkin, The Law of Employee Loyalty in the United
States, 20 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 321, 322-23, 330, 337 (1999).
132. See id. at 324-25 (discussing covenants not to compete); id. at 322-23, 326-27 (discussing
misappropriation of future business opportunities, trade secrets, customer contacts, or company good
will); id. at 337 (discussing disclosure of confidential information as breach of trust). See, e.g., Beard
Research v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 589-612 (Del. Ch. 2010) (discussing misappropriation of trade secrets
and customer contacts, misuse of confidential information, and tortious interference with future business
opportunities); Lamorte Bums & Co., Inc. v. Walters 770 A.2d 1158, 1168-69 (N.J. 2001) (discussing
disclosure of confidential information as breach of duty of loyalty). For a rare example of a lower state
court construing an employee's duty of loyalty as related to the covenant, see Cary Corp. v. Linder, No.
80589 2002 WL 31667316 at *6 (Oh. App. 2002).
133. See Bogg, supra note 11, at 138-41 (focusing on employees' implied duty of fidelity in context
of industrial action); Andrew Stewart, Good Faith: A Necessary Element in Australian Employment
Law?, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 519, 521-23, 534 (2011) (addressing employees' duty of faithful
service and also mutual duty of cooperation and non-hindrance of contract purposes); Vigneau, supra
note 11, at 104-07 (addressing good faith restrictions on various employee rights).
134. See sources discussed at note 133.
135. See Robert W. Gordan, Using History in Teaching Contracts: The Case of Britton v. Turner,
26 U. HAW. L. REv. 423, 428-29 (2004) (discussing how nineteenth century treatises grouped domestic
and industrial employment under the same master-servant categories: servants, like wives, were a form
of masters' property, owing an unqualified duty of loyalty to the masters' interests although employers
had no corresponding duty to look after their employees' interests beyond caring for them in sickness or
old age). See generally TOMLINS, supra note 9; Karsten, supra note 9.
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2. Good Faith Prior to Contract Formation
As defined by the UCC and the Restatement, the covenant imposes
obligations during contract performance and enforcement but not during the
earlier period of contract negotiation and formation.136 In the employment
setting, Delaware is the rare exception. Its supreme court has applied the
covenant to bad faith employer conduct at the contract formation stage.137
In doing so, the Delaware court made clear that when an employer acts
deceitfully to manipulate what was bargained for regarding job security, a
claim for breach of the covenant sounds only in contract. The court
declined to authorize the traditional tort remedies of punitive awards or
damages for emotional distress.' 38
In addition to Delaware, however, many states protect employees at
the hiring stage by authorizing tort law claims against employers for
fraudulently inducing workers to enter an at-will relationship. One
scholarly study concluded that the cause of action is recognized in virtually
every jurisdiction,139 even as many jurisdictions express concerns about
tension between employee claims and the at-will doctrine.140  The study
reviewed 272 reported decisions between 1990 and 2002 that involved over
750 claims for fraudulent inducement in hiring. 141 It identified four major
recurring fact patterns associated with these cases, and found that
employees were successful between one-third and one-half the time when
alleging employer deceptions with respect to: (1) terms and conditions other
than duration or job security; (2) duration of employment and/or job
security; (3) the employer's future prospects (such as economic and market
strength); and, (4) the nature of the job or primary job functions.14 2
There is, undeniably, tension between the at-will doctrine and
employee claims challenging discharges that result from fraudulent
misrepresentations by employers. A number of courts have concluded that
136. See notes 2 and 3 supra.
137. See text accompanying notes 57-62 supra (discussing Merrill).
138. See E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 444-48 (De. 1996).
139. Richard P. Pema, Deceitful Employers: Common Law Fraud as a Mechanism to Remedy
Intentional Employer Misrepresentation in Hiring, 41 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 233, 255 & n.60 (2005)
[hereinafter Pema 1]. See generally Richard P. Pema, Deceitful Employers: Intentional
Misrepresentation in Hiring and the Employment at Will Doctrine, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 587 (2005-06)
[hereinafter Perna 1l]; Sandra J. Mullings, Truth-in-Hiring Claims and the At-Will Rule: Should An
Employer Have a License to Lie? 1997 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 105 (1997).
140. See Perna 1, supra note 138, at 276-77 (referring to courts that regard hiring-fraud actions as
an attempt to circumvent the at-will doctrine by using tort theory to address a wrongful discharge);
Perna II, at 634 (discussing courts that bar hiring-fraud actions brought following termination on theory
that a prospective employee could not reasonably rely on an employer's assertions when the prospective
employment is at will).
141. See Pema I, supra note 138, at 237-38.
142. Id. at 243-44. A fifth, much smaller, category involved employer deception respecting pension
or other employee benefits. Id.
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at-will employees have no claim for intentional misrepresentation to induce
continued employment,'43 or for being fraudulently "set up" for
termination.144 These courts reason that because the at-will doctrine allows
for discharge on malicious or similarly improper grounds, even
reprehensively fraudulent conduct triggering termination is not actionable.
As expressed by one court, "the law will not punish a party for doing by
misdirection that which it has a right to do forthrightly."l 45
On the other hand, courts regularly sustain employee claims of fraud
that result in termination but do not arise out of the termination because
they are based on employer misrepresentations regarding the nature or
conditions of employment apart from the right to terminate.146 In the
leading case of Lazar v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, an
employee alleged he was induced to relocate to California from a secure
executive position in New York based on his prospective employer's
representations that he would have long-term security working for a
financially stable company.147 When Lazar's job was eliminated two years
later, he brought a claim for fraudulent inducement of his employment
contract. The California Supreme Court sustained his cause of action. The
court reasoned that the employer's misrepresentations were made separate
from-not in the course of-Lazar's termination, and that absent these
misrepresentations, the employer "would not have been in the position to
terminate Lazar, because Lazar ... would not have consented to the
employment contract in the first place." 48
State jurisdictions have long approved employee causes of action for
fraudulent inducement or "hiring fraud." Courts often rely on
misrepresentations about the employer's financial strength or organizational
stability.149  They also invoke misrepresentations made to employees
regarding certain specific terms and conditions of employment.5 o When
143. See, e.g., Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Co., 623 N.W.2d 739, 745 (Wisc. 2001) (alleging
supervisor misrepresented to employee that his position would not be affected by a reorganization).
144. See, e.g., Wisehart v. Meganck, 66 P.3d 124, 125, 128 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002); Tatge v.
Chambers & Owen, Inc. 579 N.W.2d 217, 218-21 (1998); Burrell v. Carraway Methodist Hospitals of
Ala., 607 So.2d 193, 196 (Ala. 1992).
145. Wisehart, 66 P.3d at 128. But cf Johnson v. Mil-Ken Motors, Inc., 894 P.2d 540, 545-46
(Ore. Ct. App. 1995) (reinstating claim by discharged employee for intentional misrepresentation to
induce continuing employment).
146. See Mullings, supra note 139, at 112, 122-27.
147. 909 P.2d 981, 983-84 (Cal. 1996).
148. Id. at 988.
149. See, e.g., Stehm v. Nordam Grp., 170 P.3d 546, 547-49 (Okla. Ct. Civ. App. 2007); McConkey
v. Aon Corp. 804 A.2d 572, 585-87 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2002); Meade v. Cedarapids Inc., 164 F.3d 1218,
1223 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying Oregon law); Berger v. Sec. Pac. Info. Sys. Inc., 795 P.2d 1380, 1383-74
(Colo. Ct. App. 1990); Wildes v. Pens Unlimited Co., 389 A.2d 837, 841 (Me. 1978).
150. See, e.g., Betterman v. Fleming Companies Inc., 677 N.W.2d 673, 677 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2004)
(misrepresentation regarding terms of employer's medical and disability leave policy); Bemmes v. Pub.
Employees Ret. Sys. of Ohio, 658 N.E.2d 31, 34-35 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (misrepresentation regarding
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upholding these claims, courts point to policy justifications that extend
beyond the interests of the contracting parties before them. Thus, the
California Supreme Court emphasized "advance[ment of] the public interest
in punishing intentional misrepresentations and in deterring such
misrepresentations in the future.""s1 Similarly, a federal court applying
Louisiana law reasoned that unless at-will employees could maintain hiring-
fraud actions, "employers [would be given] carte blanche to make
fraudulent promises of job security to induce individuals into short-term
employment." 52
It makes sense in public policy terms that truth-in-hiring claims by
discharged employees have been broadly endorsed, in that such claims
"appropriately police[] the employment bargaining process for intentional
bargaining irregularities."1 53  It might well make comparable sense for
courts broadly to endorse good faith claims brought as a direct result of
employee discharges. Such claims, based on the covenant, could be viewed
as appropriately policing intentional bargaining irregularities with respect to
job security.154 Further, the line between tort and contract in this setting has
become blurred. Courts approving employee tort claims for hiring fraud
have generally awarded damages based on the same benefit-of-the-bargain
approach adopted for breaches of the covenant."' Awarding damages to
the defrauded employee that "will most nearly approximate the benefits he
would have realized under the contract had the representations which
induced him to contract been true"' 5 6 is strikingly similar to the approach
followed by courts that have applied the covenant to protect identified
benefits employees would have realized as part of their post-hiring
employment bargain.1 57
In the end, however, courts treat covenant breach and hiring fraud
differently in analytical terms because an employment relationship already
employee eligibility for employer's retirement program); Kidder v. AmSouth Bank, 639 So.2d 1361,
1362 (Ala. 1994) (alleging misrepresentation as to employee's working conditions); Franz v. Iolalo Inc.,
801 F. Supp. 1537, 1539-42 (E.D. La. 1992) (applying Louisiana law) (alleging misrepresentation as to
employee's job security). See generally Mullings, supra note 139, at 122-30.
151. Lazar, 909 P.2d at 990.
152. Franz, 801 F. Supp. at 1542.
153. Perna II, supra note 139, at 626.
154. The Delaware Supreme Court essentially endorsed this approach in Pressman, but it remains
the exception.
155. See, e.g., McConkey v. Aon Corp., 804 A.2d 572, 587 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2002) (reporting that
"numerous courts have applied the 'benefit-of the bargain' damages rule in cases where the employment
was, as here, at-will, notwithstanding the occurrence of intervening events that made the employee's
performance impossible, such as termination of a project").
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Mitford v. de LaSala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1006-07 (Alaska 1983); Fortune v. National
Cash Register, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255-58 (Mass. 1976).
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exists in the former setting but not the latter.15 8 This distinction in turn
reflects the powerful presence of at-will as a default term for most
employment contracts. Courts regularly express concern about the
fundamental inequalities in information and bargaining power between
individuals and prospective employers. But once individuals have entered a
contractual employment relationship, judicial concern for employees'
vulnerability in the face of "intentional bargaining irregularities"
substantially disappears. The continuing vitality of the at-will doctrine is
the key factor accounting for this altered perspective.
1II. THE PERVASIVE INFLUENCE OF EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL
A. At-Will's Persistence as a Default Rule
As is well known, American common law departed from its English
roots when it developed the at-will rule in the late nineteenth century.159
The presumption that indefinite-term hirings were terminable at the
discretion of either party, that there was no mutuality of obligation
regarding job tenure in these contracts, coincided with the rise of laissez-
faire capitalism.160  In the words of a leading legal historian, "[i]f
employees could be dismissed on a moment's notice, obviously they could
not claim a voice in the determination of the conditions of work or the use
of the product of their labor."' 61 During the early twentieth century, the
Supreme Court constitutionalized the doctrine of mutuality. When
invalidating federal and state laws that limited employers' right to discharge
their at-will employees, the Court reasoned that "the employer and the
employee have equality of right [to discharge or to quit], and any legislation
that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of
contract which no government can legally justify in a free land." 62
158. See, e.g., Betterman v. Fleming Companies Inc., 677 N.W.2d 673, 679-80 (Wisc. Ct. App.
2004) (distinguishing McKenzie v. Miller Brewing Co., 623 N.W.2d 739 (Wisc. 2001), and Tatge v.
Chambers & Owen, Inc., 579 N.W.2d 217 (1998)); Kidder v. AmSouth Bank, 639 So.2d 1361, 1362
(Ala. 1994) (distinguishing Burrell v. Carraway Methodist Hospitals of Ala., 607 So. 2d 193 (Ala.
1992)).
159. See, e.g., STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 47-64
(4th ed. 2006); MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 29-33 (6th ed. 2007); 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 413 (1765) (reporting that under English common law, "If the
hiring be general without any particular time limited, the law construes it to be a hiring for a year").
160. See Feinman, supra note 10, at 131-34; Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite
Employment Contracts in the United States and England An Historical Analysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L.J. 85,
116-18 (1982).
161. See Feinman, supra note 10, at 133.
162. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908) (invalidating federal statute that
prohibited employers from discharging employees on grounds of union membership). See Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1915) (invalidating state statute that made it unlawful for employers to
require non-membership in union as condition of employment). See generally U.S. CONST., Art. I. § 10,
cl. 1 (prohibiting "Law(s) impairing the Obligation of Contracts").
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This Lochner-era conclusion that government regulation of the
employment relationship violated the parties' freedom of contract was
overruled during the New Deal. In upholding the constitutionality of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the Court recognized Congress'
lawful and proper role in safeguarding employees' ability to obtain decent
working conditions when bargaining with their employers.' 63 Since the
1930s, Congress and state legislatures have overridden the at-will
presumption on innumerable occasions-assuring employees the right to
nondiscriminatory treatment'64 and establishing that employees may not be
retaliated against for engaging in protected conduct or for blowing the
whistle on employer misconduct.'65
Decades of statutory changes, however, have not supplanted the vital
albeit interstitial role of employment-at-will. Although legislation now
prohibits employers from relying on a range of specific bad-faith motives
when firing their workers, employers remain otherwise free to terminate
employees at their discretion. Indeed, the mosaic of particularized
legislative responses may subtly reinforce common law reluctance to alter
the general background. Importantly, employers do not face any statutory
obligation to justify discharges by giving reasons based on their employees'
conduct or job performance, their own business circumstances, or their
good faith belief regarding such performance or circumstances. Assuming
they have not contracted away their freedom to terminate, employers may
do so for arbitrary, manipulative, or malicious reasons as long as those
reasons have not been forbidden under federal or state statutes.
The persistence of employment-at-will as a default is, of course, not
inadvertent. Although few judges say so explicitly, at least one court has
emphasized the importance of remaining free from an affirmative good faith
requirement that would constrain employer prerogatives, noting that such
freedom helps to attract and retain businesses and hence jobs.166 Recent
empirical studies furnish some support for this position. One study found
163. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1937). See also West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-93 (1937) (sustaining legislative power to impose basic
protection for workers under state minimum wage law).
164. See, e.g., Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e to e-17 (2006); Equal Pay
Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §206(d) (2006); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§
621-34; Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-13 (2008).
165. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3); Occupational Safety
and Health Act § 1 I(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1); Michigan Whistleblowers Protection Act, MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 15.361-15.369 (West 2004); Texas Whistleblower Act, TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN., §
554.002 (Vernon 2004).
166. See Whittaker v. Care-More, 621 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tenn. 1981) (declining to adopt either a
good faith or public policy exception, observing that Tennessee has attracted many new industries in
recent years, enhancing per capita income, and "the impact on the continuation of such influx of new
businesses should be carefully considered before any substantial modification is made in the employee-
at-will rule.").
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that a state's adoption of the good faith exception correlated with significant
increases in the temporary help industry in that state. 167 Another study
concluded that a state's approval of the good faith exception reduced the
entry of new establishments.' 68  The possible costs associated with a
systemic modification of the at-will rule presumably help explain why the
covenant has not been embraced to nearly the same degree as more
selectively applicable exceptions based on an employer's handbook or a
state's pre-existing public policy.169
In addition to its robust persistence in formal default terms, the at-will
doctrine has had a significant informal impact on the development of
federal laws regulating the workplace. In various distinct settings, courts
have invoked or adverted to at-will norms when restricting employee rights
and protections created by Congress. Examples from three significant
statutes illustrate this point.
B. At-Will's Constraining Impact on Federal Statutes
1. National Labor Relations Act
The NLRA may be justly regarded as the first major federal wrongful
discharge statute. As part of protecting employees who engage in
organizing or collective bargaining activity, the law prohibits employers
from "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
[undertaken] to encourage or discourage [union] membership."17 0 Yet the
Supreme Court has made clear that an employer may lawfully close down
its operations, discharging all its employees and retaining its assets for
future investment, based on overt and highly visible anti-union animus.171
Despite the NLRA's plain language prohibiting such improperly motivated
tenure-of-employment decisions, the Court found compelling the
underlying proposition that a businessman may "choose to go out of
business if he wants to." 72  This proposition-a corollary of the
presumption that employers retain unilateral control over their workforce-
trumped the Act's explicit protections. 173
167. See Thomas J. Miles, Common Law Exceptions to Employment at Will and US. Labor
Markets, 16 J. L. ECON & ORG. 74, 93-94, 98 (2000).
168. See David H. Autor, William R. Kerr & Adriana D. Kugler, Does Employment Protection
Reduce Productivity?: Evidence from US States, 117 EcON J. F189, F190 (2007). For discussion of
these and other related studies, see Bird, supra note 130, at 424-27.
169. See supra notes 13-14, and accompanying text (noting that forty-one states have adopted
employer handbook exception and all fifty states have adopted some version of public policy exception).
170. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
171. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
172. Id. at 270.
173. See Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of
Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 79 (2000). See also First National Maintenance Corp. v.
800
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Similarly, the NLRA recognizes employees' right to strike as part of
their right to engage in concerted activity. 174 But even though employees
may not be discharged for engaging in this protected right, the Supreme
Court has held that an employer may permanently replace striking
employees as part of his "right to protect and continue his business."175
Like the right to discontinue his business, an employer's implied right to
operate as he sees fit by hiring permanent replacements is linked to the
presumption of employer control over the workforce. That presumption
effectively reduces employees to little more than disposable assets in the
strike setting. 176
2. Title VII
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is the most important employee
protection statute enacted in the past half-century. The law prohibits
employers from discharging or refusing to hire individuals because of their
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.177 As is true under the NLRA,
however, judicial application of Title VII protections has been constrained
by at-will's continuing influence. That influence is made clear in Supreme
Court decisions allocating the burden of proof.
Under Title VII, a discharged employee alleging discriminatory
treatment makes out a prima facie case by showing that she was in the
statute's protected class, that she was terminated, and that she was replaced
by someone outside that class, typically a white male.77 The employer
then bears a burden of production-not persuasion-to offer a
nondiscriminatory explanation for its discharge decision, meaning an
explanation unrelated to one of the prohibited traits. 179  The discharged
employee has a chance to refute this explanation by showing it is pretextual,
but if she succeeds and does nothing more, she may well still lose as a
matter of law. The Court has determined that in order to prevail she must
prove that the employer acted from a prohibited discriminatory motive, not
NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677-79 (1981) (holding that employer was not obligated to bargain in good faith
about a decision to close a portion of its business, because management's interests in profitability and
efficiency were "akin to the decision whether to be in business at all," and those interests trumped any
conceivable union interest in protecting the job security of its members).
174. See 29 U.S.C. § 157, 163.
175. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).
176. See Summers, supra note 173, at 80-81; James J. Brudney, To Strike or Not to Strike, 1999
Wis. L. REv. 65, 69-72, 77-81 (1999).
177. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
178. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). See generally Texas Dept. of
Cmty Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973).
179. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
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simply that the employer's articulated motive was false. 8 0 The presence of
the at-will background norm means that an employer need not establish he
acted reasonably or even honestly in his discharge decision.' 8 1
Discriminatory discharge cases under Title VII also may involve an
employer acting from multiple motivations, only one of which is prohibited
by the statute. In these "mixed motive" cases, assuming the employee
proves that her discharge was partially motivated by her sex or race, the
employer may still avoid the remedies of reinstatement and back pay by
showing he would have made the same decision anyway for
nondiscriminatory reasons. 1 82  Once again, an employer's
"nondiscriminatory" reasons that are sufficient to support discharge may be
arbitrary, unjustified, dishonest, or just plain silly.183 In explaining its
conclusion that allows employers to escape liability for reinstatement even
when acting in part from unlawful motivation, the Court pointed to its view
of the statute as "preserv[ing] . . . an employer's remaining freedom of
choice," a thinly veiled reference to employment-at-will.18 4
In addition to affecting the contours of employee protections under
Title VII, the at-will rule also contributes to divisive tensions between
employees who are covered by the statute and employees who are not. As
perceptively explained by Cynthia Estlund, the presence of Title VII means
that employers are likely to be sensitive, or at least cautious, when
considering disciplinary and discharge decisions involving female or
minority employees. In this respect, even the qualified rights and remedies
available under Title VII are preferable to the "unalloyed and merciless at-
will regime" experienced by white male employees.' It is therefore to be
expected that "[e]mployees who are not 'protected' . . . may perceive
fairness itself as a special privilege from which they are excluded."' 86
Estlund describes claims of "reverse discrimination" by this excluded
180. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 514-15. See generally William R. Corbett, The "Fall" of
Summers, the "Rise" of "Pretext-Plus," and the Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment
Discrimination Law to Employment at Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REv. 305,
343-45 (1996); Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L.
REv. 1655, 1670-71 (1996).
181. See Estlund, supra note 180, at 1671.
182. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1989). Congress partially overrode
Price Waterhouse in the 1991 Civil Rights Act, so that employees establishing partial discrimination are
now prevailing parties with a right to declaratory relief and attorney's fees even if not to reinstatement
or back pay. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g). This
modification is unique to Title VIL: employers establishing a "same decision anyway" defense prevail in
full for mixed motive discharges under the NLRA and the First Amendment. See NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 399-401 (1983) (NLRA); Mt. Healthy City School
District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977) (First Amendment).
183. See generally, Corbett, supra note 180, at 337-39; Estlund, supra note 180, at 1672.
184. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242.
185. Estlund, supra note 180, at 1681.
186. Id.
802
HeinOnline  -- 32 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 802 2010-2011
UNITED STATES
majority as "a tempting response that mirrors the victim-orientation of
wrongful discharge law and aggravates the dynamic of fragmentation and
polarization." 87
3. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
The final statutory illustration of at-will's enduring influence is the
more recently enacted Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
(WARN).' 8 8  As the law's acronym suggests, WARN did not challenge
business's right to close plants or offices and terminate large numbers of
employees. The law instead sought to make companies accountable to
employees and local communities, through advance notice combined with
access to government-operated adjustment and training programs designed
to assist dislocated workers. 89 Notwithstanding its modest goals, WARN
experienced perhaps the most controversial rite of passage for any federal
legislation enacted during the 1980s.
A major and unsuccessful advance notice bill targeted at plant closings
had been introduced in the early 1970s.190 It called for up to two years'
notice and provided for displaced workers to receive severance pay,
relocation allowances, and retraining benefits.191 In 1985, a more cautious
bill in the House had proposed ninety days' advance notice along with
employer consultation (not bargaining) with the union or employees on
ways to minimize anticipated job losses, but no severance payments or
relocation benefits.' 92 This bill was voted down on the House floor despite
the presence of a Democratic majority.193
The WARN Act, introduced in January 1987 and enacted in July 1988,
requires sixty days' advance notice before a plant closing or mass layoff.19 4
There are no provisions for severance pay or employer consultation. There
are, however, a number of exclusions-notably for layoffs affecting fewer
187. Id.
188. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (effective 1989).
189. See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(2) (mandating notice to "the entity designated by the State to carry out
rapid response activities"). The advance notice provisions were introduced in 1987 as part of a larger
bill addressing the training and adjustment needs of dislocated workers. See S. Rep. No.100-62, at 3-14
(1987).
190. See H.R. 13541, 93d Cong. (1974) (National Employment Priorities Act); S. 2809, 93d Cong.
(1973) (National Employment Priorities Act). Additional bills requiring advance notice were introduced
regularly until the early 1980s. See, e.g., National Community Notification Act, H.R. 5829, 98" Cong.
(1984).
191. See H.R. 13541, §§ 2301, 2401-03, 2411-12, 93d Cong. (1974) (requiring two years' advance
notice and providing for income maintenance benefits, job retraining benefits, and relocation
allowances); S. 2809, 93d Cong. (1973) (same section numbers, same requirements and provisions). See
also H.R. 5829, § 3, 98' Cong. (1984) (requiring one year advance notice).
192. See H.R. 1616, 990 Cong. (1985).
193. See 131 Cong. Rec. 32,939 (1985) (Roll No. 421, 208-203).
194. See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a).
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than fifty employees or (for larger enterprises) affecting less than one-third
of the workforce-and also several exceptions, most importantly for
business circumstances not reasonably foreseeable at the time notice would
have been required.'95 WARN's tempered set of constraints on employers'
ability to displace large numbers of employees were enacted only after
eighteen months of intense and divisive political dialogue.196  President
Reagan vetoed the bill and the Senate failed to override by a four-vote
margin."' When Congress passed the bill a second time, Reagan allowed it
to become law without his signature-the only such occurrence during his
eight-year presidency.198
Resistance from the employer community"' and its leading
supporters200 could hardly have been more fierce. Even when Business
Week reported that 86% of the public favored having the federal
government require sixty days' advance notice,201 American business
remained adamant in opposition. The breadth and intensity of this
opposition is best understood by reference to employment-at-will. WARN
195. See 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3) (defining mass layoff); id. at § 2102(b)(2)(A) (describing
reasonably foreseeable business circumstances exception).
196. See Senate Defies Veto Threat on Trade Bill, WASH. POST, July 10, 1987, at Bl; Stuart
Auerbach, Conferees, Defying Veto Threat, Back Notice on Plant Layoffs, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1988,
at Fl; Stuart Auerbach, Senate Democrats Defeat Effort to Weaken Plant-Closing Bill, WASH. POST,
June 28, 1988, at El; Tom Kenworthy, Democrats See Plant-Closing Notice as Campaign Issue, WASH.
POST, July 14, 1988, at A6; Steven V. Roberts, Reagan is Pressed On Plant Closings, N.Y. TIMES, July
26, 1988, at Al.
197. See 134 CONG. REC. 13529 (1988) (reprinting President Reagan's veto message, dated May 24,
1988); id. at H3552 (House overrides veto by 308-113); id. at S7385 (daily ed. June 8, 1988) (Senate
sustains veto by 61-37).
198. See Steven V. Roberts, President Decides Not to Veto Bill Requiring Notice of Plant Closings,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1988, at Al; 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 990 (1988) (President's Statement on
the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act). Under Art. I. § 7 of the U. S. Constitution, a
bill becomes law after being passed by both chambers of Congress and presented to the President if he
fails to sign or veto the bill within ten days.
199. See, e.g., Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act, H.R. 1122: Hearing
Before the Subcommittees on Labor-Management Relations and Economic Opportunities of the H.
Comm. on Education and Labor, 100' Cong. 80 (1987) (statement of J. Bruce Johnston on behalf of
Nat'l Ass'n of Manufacturers (NAM), criticizing plant closing proposal as "punitive ... divisive and
unconstructive"); id at 99 (letter from John Irving, NAM Special Counsel, asserting that proposal would
"jeopardize any competitive edge American businesses currently enjoy"); Economic Dislocation and
Worker Adjustment Assistance Act: Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Labor and the
Subcommittee on Employment and Productivity of the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 100
Cong. 146 (1987) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Frank P. Doyle on behalf of the
Committee for Economic Development, asserting the advance notice requirements will "decrease the
flexibility and competitiveness of U.S. companies, especially . . . smaller firms"); id at 166 (statement
of Allan R. Thieme on behalf of U.S. Chamber of Commerce, criticizing proposed requirements as
"restrictive, inflexible, expensive and counterproductive to the goals of preserving jobs and assuring
profitability").
200. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 199, at 10 (statement of Sen. Gordon Humphrey,
describing proposal as "a Marxist economist's dream"); 134 CONG. REC. 16118 (1988) statement of Sen.
Philip Gramm, asserting that "this bill represents the worst of America"); The Job-Destruction Bill,
Editorial, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Mar. 26, 1987.
201. BUSINESS WEEK, July 20, 1987, at 71 (reporting results from Business Week/Harris Poll).
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is far less protective than European laws that preceded it and that have been
maintained or strengthened since 1988.202 But American employers could
not countenance even a modest incursion on their untrammeled
entrepreneurial powers to lay off or discharge employees as they deemed
appropriate.
After twenty years of implementation, WARN's exclusions and
exceptions-necessary to secure congressional passage in 1988-have
turned out to diminish the scope and effectiveness of the sixty-day notice
requirement.203 In addition, federal courts have been less than enthusiastic
when enforcing the statute. Although WARN's remedial and protective
purposes are clear, courts have expansively construed key provisions
excluding layoffs under a certain size204 and excusing lack of notice based
on unforeseeable business circumstances. 205 Once again, the at-will default
rule seems to play a meaningful if subtle role. Individual employees
unsuccessfully asserting their right to sixty days' notice (or a backpay
remedy) are not much worse off in practical terms than employees who are
simply laid off or discharged. Working from a paradigm that confers
unlimited managerial power over job tenure decisions, federal courts may
tend to regard employees as having little to lose when they assert a statutory
right that is ultimately derivative of their soft stake in job security.
It is important not to overstate the impact of the at-will rule on federal
employee protection statutes. Courts deciding job-loss related cases under
the NLRA, Title VII, and WARN rely on statute-specific justifications that
may be persuasive in doctrinal terms. For each statute, however, the
background norm of an at-will workplace helps to explain resolutions that
decline to credit or sufficiently value employee job security interests in
contested settings. Given at-will's substantial influence in curtailing
202. See JOHN BOWERS, A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO EMPLOYMENT LAW, 439-82 (7th ed. 2005)
(discussing European consultation and notice requirements under 1975 EC Directive on Collective
Redundancies and successor directives, and also European job security protections under 1977 EC
Directive on Acquired Rights and successor directives). European countries have implemented these
substantial employee protection requirements through domestic legislation and court decisions. See,
e.g., Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 (SI 1981/74); Litster v.
Forth Dry Dock & Eng'g Co. Ltd., [1989] 1 All E.R. 1134 (HL 1989).
203. See Testimony of Richard Trumka, Secretary-treasurer, AFL-CIO, at Senate Health Education
Labor Pensions Committee Hearing (May 20, 2008); GAO, THE WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND
RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT (Sept. 2003); GAO, DISLOCATED WORKERS: WORKER ADJUSTMENT
AND RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT NOT MEETING ITS GOALS (Feb. 23, 1993). There are recent
proposals to strengthen the law so that more employees losing their jobs are able to receive adequate
notice. See S.1374, 11 1 Cong. (2009); H.R. 3042, 11 1" Cong. (2009).
204. See, e.g., Rifkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 78 F.3d 1277 (8th Cir. 1996); Guinn v. Timco
Aviation Services Inc., 317 F.Supp.2d 888 (W.D. Ark. 2004).
205. See, e.g., Watson v. Michigan Industrial Holdings, Inc., 311 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 2002);
Burnsides v. MJ Optical, Inc., 128 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 1997); Loehrer v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 98
F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1996).
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explicit legislative obligations imposed on employers, its impact on implied
common law duties is hardly surprising.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Britain and other European countries, employees have a statutory
right not to be unfairly dismissed, and the employer bears a burden to
demonstrate valid work-related reasons for any dismissal.206 In contrast,
Congress and state legislatures have been unwilling to impose on employers
an affirmative obligation to justify employee discharges. 207  The one
systemic exception in the United States involves employees covered by
collectively bargained agreements.
These negotiated agreements routinely specify, as part of a Discipline
Article, that employees may only be dismissed for "just cause" established
by the employer.208 Just cause typically includes both substantive and
procedural components. Substantively, employers must show an
unacceptable level of employee performance, by reference to inadequate
attendance, disobedience of reasonable work rules, failure to produce a
reasonable quantity and quality of work, or conduct that interferes with the
employer's ability to carry on its business.209 Procedurally, an employer
typically may not discharge employees who fail to meet substantive
standards unless she provides adequate notice and an opportunity to be
heard, applies progressive discipline, and adheres to some form of equal
treatment.210
When job security is protected by just cause as a core element of
collective bargaining agreements, the covenant's status becomes more
firmly embedded. The covenant assures that parties to a collectively
negotiated contract receive the fruits of that contract, including presumptive
206. See, e.g., Employment Rights Act 1996, c. 18, §§ 94-98 (Eng.); Kiindigungsschutzgesetz
[KSchG] [Dismissal Protection Act], Aug. 25, 1969 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB] at § 1 (Ger.); CODE DU
TRAVAIL art. L 122-14, L 321-I (Fr.).
207. See supra note 88 (discussing Montana as the only state that has enacted a law prohibiting
termination without good cause).
208. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD COX, DEREK CURTIS BOK, ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W.
FINKIN, LABOR LAW CASES AND MATERIALS, 2009 STATUTORY APPENDIX AND CASE SUPPLEMENT
113-14 (14th ed. 2009) (setting forth Discipline Article of an illustrative collective bargaining
agreement).
209. See, e.g., id at 113 (listing as causes for immediate discharge inter alia failure to report for
duty without bona fide reasons, refusal to comply with conspicuously posted company rules, bringing
narcotics or intoxicants into the workplace, disorderly conduct, and deliberate destruction or removal of
company property).
210. See, e.g., id. at 113-14 (discussing requirements of notice accompanied by statement of
reasons, and use of progressive discipline); id. at 114-15 (setting forth multi-step grievance procedure
culminating in arbitration).
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job stability.211 Arbitrators regularly apply the covenant in job security-
related contexts, to assure that the just cause standard is properly adhered
tO212 but also to address subcontracting disputes213 and to help define and
limit application of the management rights clause.214  One arbitrator
referred to the covenant as "form[ing] the heart of any successful collective
bargaining relationship." 215
Collective bargaining agreements, however, apply to less than 8% of
the private sector workforce. 216  The bottom line is that the covenant's
scope and vibrancy are circumscribed in the absence of a broad-based
foundation for job security. A handful of state courts have protected
compensation-related benefits of the bargain against opportunistic employer
misconduct. Even fewer have applied the covenant directly to the job
security term of an agreement, and they rely on the employer's deceitful
manipulation of that term rather than on a general theory of bad faith or
malicious termination. 21 7
Courts reviewing disputes at the hiring stage are prepared to impose
upon knowledgeable and powerful employers an affirmative duty to provide
truthful or at least non-distortive information to vulnerable employees
regarding their prospective employment.2 18  But once these unequally
endowed employers and employees have formed a contract, the great
211. See generally ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 7, at 478-79 (noting that majority of arbitral
decisions addressing the covenant involve employee discharges).
212. See, e.g., Sierra Chemical Co., 121 Lab. Arb. 1593, 1595 (2006) (Pool, Arb.) (holding that
employer's failure to conduct thorough investigation before discharging employee violated the
covenant).
213. See, e.g., Libbey Glass, 116 Lab. Arb. 182, 186-87 (2000) (Ruben, Arb.) (observing that
covenant requires management to demonstrate its subcontracting decision was made in good faith and
was objectively reasonable; union is not required to prove "bad faith" on the part of management);
United Technologies Automotive, 108 Lab. Arb. 769, 772 (1997) (Richard, Arb.) (holding that
management's exercise of its residual right to subcontract is limited by the covenant implied in all labor
agreements, and that to meet their burden of proof under the covenant, employers must establish at least
a good faith belief in the sound economic reasoning for subcontracting work previously carried out by
bargaining unit members, and perhaps even conclusive proof that special economic needs exist).
214. See, e.g., Miami Beach Fraternal Order of Police, 1997 WL910355 at *8 (1997) (Kravit, Arb.)
(relying on covenant to hold that in exercising its right to transfer employees on operational grounds,
management discretion must be applied reasonably and may be reviewed to determine if it has been
applied in an arbitrary, discriminatory, or capricious manner); Ashland Oil, 95 LA 339, 344-45 (1990)
(Volz, Arb.) (holding that under covenant, management in the exercise of its reserved authority must "do
what is reasonably contractually required, even though a cheaper method might be found by
disregarding the fruits of the bargain which the parties accorded to the adversely affected employees").
215. Indianapolis Pub. Transp. Corp., 94 Lab. Arb. 1299, 1303 (1990) (Volz, Arb.).
216. Private sector union membership fell to 7.2% in 2009 and 6.9% in 2010, as the recession hit
unionized jobs especially hard. See Larry Swisher, Unions Lost 771,000 Members in 2009, as Recession
Eliminated Jobs, BLS Says, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), ian. 25, 2010, at AA-l; Larry Swisher, Union
Membership Dropped in 2010 as Key Industries Shed Jobs, BLS Says, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Jan. 21,
2011, at AA-1. Unions represented 7.7% of all employed private sector workers in 2010. See id. at E-3.
217. See Delaware Supreme Court in Merrill v. Crothall-Am., Inc., 606 A.2d 96 (Del. 1992) and
E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436 (Del. 1996); Montana Supreme Court in
Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hospital, 693 P.2d 487, 490, 492 (Mont. 1984).
218. See authorities and cases discussed at supra notes 139-152 and accompanying text.
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majority of jurisdictions regard it as unjustified and unwise to insist on a
similar affirmative duty of honest dealing. Judicial reluctance is primarily
attributable to the perceived tension between a recently promoted employer
obligation to act honestly and fairly when terminating employees and an
entrenched employer right to terminate without any such limitations. It is
not readily apparent why courts might abandon their reluctance in the near
future.
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